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COMBATING TERRORISM AGAINST
COMMERCIAL AVIATION
C. Kurt Zorn
Indiana University

G eneral concern about terrorism and sabotage
in the United States has grown in the

Heightened commercial aviation security, while good
for the safety of the traveling public, is not without its

aftermath of the sabotage of Amtrak in Arizona, the

costs.

Besides the

direct

costs

associated with

bombing of the federal office building in Oklahoma

employing additional security personnel and equipment

City, the bomb threat at the New York regional air

are the indirect costs-the opportunity costs-associated

traffic control center, and the bombing of the World

w ith the inevitable delays that accompany more careful

Trade Center. A concomitant concern has developed

screening of passengers and their luggage. Tighter

with regard to the adequacy of security at domestic

security requires the traveler to allot more time to

airports and in commercial aviation. Twice in a three

make flights because curbside check-in is not avail

month period in 1995 the Federal Aviation Adminis

able, metal detectors are more sensitive leading to

tration (FAA) increased airport security. In August

more false alarms, more luggage is searched, and gate

1995, the FAA ordered heightened airport security

agents are asking passengers more questions.’ The

procedures due to concern within the Clinton Adminis

obvious question is whether the benefits gained from

tration about the threat of more frequent and more

enhanced aviation security justify the costs.

deadly terrorist attacks in the United States.1 Then, in
October 1995, the FAA once again increased airport

During the first part of the 1990s strides have been

security due to concern about the visit of Pope John

made in the improvement of commercial aviation

Paul II, progress in the Palestinian and Israeli peace

security

process, and the conviction of ten Muslim terrorists.

advancements, there is a lot yet to be done. This paper

in

the

United

States.

Despite

these

provides an overview of developments in commercial
Concern with the security of commercial aviation

aviation security in the United States during the first

reached an all-time high after the bombing of Pan Am

part of the 1990s, discussing the accomplishments and

Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December

setbacks encountered, and outlines the challenges that

1988. This deadly act of terrorism prompted passage of

remain.

the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 (1990
Act) which set a number of goals for the enhancement

BACKGROUND

of commercial aviation security. In the early 1990s

The FAA has responsibility for the safety and security

concern seemed to ebb as acts of terrorism against U.S.

of commercial aviation in the United States. The

targets decreased only to be heightened by the events

FAA’s approach to ensuring security in commercial

in Oklahoma City and the explosion aboard TWA

aviation has evolved over the years in response to

Flight 800 in July 1996.: There was a realization that

changes in the complexion and frequency of terrorism.

terrorists are finding targets in the United States more

The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 heightened

attractive and attacks on the traveling public were

concern about the security of commercial aviation to

likely to increase.
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such an extent that Congress passed the Aviation

population larger than the civilian or military victims

Security Improvement Act of 1990.

attacked or threatened.”5

The 1990 Act underscored concern about aviation

In truth, terrorist acts within the borders of the United

security shared by Congress and the general public. It

States have been rare. For example, during the 1987-

contained many mandates and directives for the FAA

1992 time period there were a total of 38 terrorist

including:

incidents, another 31 suspected terrorist incidents, and
24 terrorist acts that were thwarted. These incidents

•

•

•

“FAA and the FBI were required to jointly assess

ranged in severity from relatively simple acts with no

the threats to and vulnerabilities of the nation’s

injuries or loss of life to significant attacks with

airports

injuries and loss of life.

FAA was required to review the security programs

variety

of foreign air carriers and approve those that

hijackings, explosives, and the use of incendiary

provide a level of protection similar to that provided

devices. However, the acts tended to be on the more

by U.S. carriers serving the same airport

simple end of the continuum.

approaches

The incidents involved a
including

verbal

threats,

FAA was required to study the need for additional
measures to safeguard the transportation of cargo
and mail by passenger aircraft

•

of

FAA was directed to support the acceleration of

TABLE 1
Terrorist Activity in the United
States, 1987-92
Terrorist

research to develop explosive detection equipment”4
Year

Terrorist

Suspected

Acts

Incident

Incident

Prevented

5

It was hoped these measures would greatly improve
commercial

aviation

security

in

the

U.S.

and

throughout the world.

The Threat
Clearly the 1990 Act was a direct response to the Pan
Am bombing and concern about increased terrorist
activity against commercial aviation in the United
States. Before discussing the progress the FAA has
made toward the objectives set forth by the Act, it is
reasonable to ask how real is the threat against

1987

9

8

1988

9

5

3

1989

4

16

7

1990

7

1

5

1991

5

1

4

1992

4

0

0

Total

38

31

24

Source: United States General Accounting Office,
Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet
Domestic and International Challenges (Washington,
D.C.: Government Accounting Office, GAO/RCED94-38. January 1994), Table 1.1, page 11.

commercial aviation.
During the past five years, there have been few
It is important to understand what is meant by

incidents of terrorism against commercial aviation

terrorism. A working definition of terrorism has been

targets either in the United States or the rest of the

formulated by the Office and Technology Assessment

world. The majority of terrorist incidents that have

(OTA). OTA defines terrorism as “... the deliberate

occurred have been targeted against the flag carriers of

employment of violence or the threat of violence by

countries which have been experiencing a degree of

sovereign states or subnational

possibly

civil unrest or upheaval. While commercial aviation

encouraged or assisted by sovereign states, to attain

recently has not been targeted by terrorists, the threat

strategic or political objectives by acts in violation of

is always present.

groups,

law intended to create a climate of fear in a target

10
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Traditionally the source of the threat to commercial

A recent Department of Defense study on the future of

aviation has been from explosives contained in checked

terrorism

highlights the concern for commercial

luggage, carry-on baggage, and mail. There is grow ing

aviation.8 Terrorists no longer seem satisfied with a

concern that, as advances are made in detecting

few casualties; the trend is toward acts that cause mass

explosives in checked and carry-on luggage, terrorists

casualties. The United States already is painfully aware

may turn to more exotic devices as a way to achieve

of this trend toward more spectacular acts of sabotage.

their objectives against commercial aviation. One such

Terrorists will use all targets they consider vulnerable

device is the handheld missile, a weapon that is

and appropriate; it seems logical that commercial

becoming more common in the terrorist’s arsenal. Up

aviation and the infrastructure supporting the air

to now, most missile attacks against civilian aircraft

transport system in the United States will be targeted.

have occurred in areas of the world that have been

Recognizing this threat, a lot of effort and money has

experiencing insurgencies. During the 1978-93 time

gone into improving the security of commercial

span, 15 of 26 attacks occurred in Angola, Sudan, and

aviation in the United States.

Afghanistan. These attacks were infrequent over the
1978-93 time span, but their frequency has increased
in recent years.6

DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMERCIAL
AVIATION SECURITY
The Pan Am tragedy in December 1988 served as an

TABLE 2
Incidents of Terrorism Against
Commercial Aviation Targets
TT^
Year

Airlines

1990
1991

1

1992

0

1993*
1994*

0

1

0

39
24
12
l
4

impetus to focus attention on the current state of
commercial aviation security. In direct response to the
Pan

Am

incident,

President

Bush

created

the

Foreign

President’s Commission on Aviation Security and

Airlines

Terrorism.

(26 Aeroflot)
(11 Aeroflot)
(5 Ethiopian Airlines)
(Lufthansa)

* Estimates.
Source: Air Transport Association Congressional
briefing materials.

The

Commission

issued

its

recommendations in May 1990 and many of the
recommendations were included in the 1990 Act.
During

this

same

time

period,

the

Office

of

Technology Assessment (OTA) undertook a major
study on the subject of using technology to combat
terrorism. OTA undertook an in-depth look at a
number of security issues including research and
development of explosive detection devices and
security at airports. A few years after the OTA study,

While the data suggest the threat to U.S. commercial
aviation has not been severe, there is reason to be
concerned about the future. The potential for terrorist
activity in the United States is real, and many believe
it is growing. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) has detected an increase in terrorist “networking”

the Government Accounting Office (GAO) released a
series of studies that analyzed the current status of
commercial aviation

security and

identified the

challenges that remain.

The OTA Study
In 1989, a number of Senate committees asked OTA

and has identified a growing terrorist infrastructure.

to investigate the status of research on technologies

This infrastructure, which includes logistics support,

that could be used to protect the United States and its

equipment, training, and financial aid, is in place and

citizens from acts of terrorism. The study resulted in

ready to be tapped by terrorist groups. Both the FAA

two separate reports. The first report dealt with

and the FBI believe that, as terrorist acts increase in

research and development efforts on the federal level

the United States, airports and civilian aircraft will

to counterterrorism, especially against commercial

remain among the most attractive targets.7
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aviation, and the state of technology for the detection
and prevention of attempts to introduce explosives
aboard aircraft.0 The second report

focused on

integrated security systems and the human factors in
commercial aviation security.10

Research and Development in Explosives Detection
Systems (EDS).11

OTA

identified two general

approaches to explosives detection that were being
pursued by the FA A in 1991-bulk detection and vapor
or residue detectors. One bulk detection approach,
referred to as a nuclear method, relied on ionizing
radiation to penetrate the object being studied.

In

1991, Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) was the most
developed of the nucleartechnologies, but OTA felt its
usefulness

was

limited.12

The

other

nuclear

technologies were not promising candidates either
because they required accelerators to generate the
necessary

active

particles.

Development

of

an

acceleratorthat would be useful in a real world setting
was a long way off.
A second method of bulk detection was the use of
magnetic

resonance

and

nuclear

TABLE 3
Explosives Detection Technologies

quadrupole

resonance.nOTA did not believe this approach showed
much promise in the near term. A third method of bulk

Bulk detectors:
Using ionizing radiation
Nuclear
- Thermal Neutron Analysis
- Fast Neutron Analysis
- Nuclear Resonance Absorption of
Gamma Rays
- Associated Particle Production
- Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis
- Pulsed Fast Neutron Backscatter
- Nitrogen-13 Production with Positron
Emission Tomography
X-ray
- Transmission
- Backscatter
- Dual or Multi-Energy
- Computerized Tomography
Using non-ionizing radiation
Nuclear Magnetic Resonance
Electron Spin Resonance
Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance
Vapor or residue detectors:
Dogs
Gas Chromatography
(GC)/Chemiluminescence
GC/Electron Capture
Ion Mobility Spectrometry
Mass Spectrometry (two-stage)
Bioluminescence

detection was the use of x-ray technologies such as the
backscatter x-ray and computerized tomography.
Backscatter x-ray systems scan “a pencil beam of xrays across an object and makes two images: the
normal transmission image, created by a single detector

Source: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment, Technology Against Terrorism: The
Federal Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991),
Table 4-2, p. 39.

on the opposite side, and a backscatter image, created
by a large detector on the side of the entering beam.”14
Computerized tomography is an adaptation of the
medical CAT scan techniques. These methods of bulk
detection seemed the most promising of the three bulk
detection approaches.

Table 4 provides a brief overview of the strengths and
weaknesses OTA found with some of the more
promising EDS devices. OTA came to the conclusion
that, after its review of the “...current state-of-the-art,
[it] sees no evidence that any device, currently at the
prototype stage, is capable by itself of reliably

The second general approach to explosives detection
involved

detecting

vapors

or

residues

left

by

explosives. These detectors could be as familiar as
trained dogs or as advanced as technologies like
chemiluminescence, ion mobility spectrometry, and
bioluminescence.15
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detecting small quantities of plastic explosives in
checked baggage.”16

OTA defined “reliably” as a

device that had at least a 90 percent detection rate and
a false alarm rate that did not exceed 5 percent.

Aviation

Security.1

OTA made a number of

through before boarding a commercial aircraft in the

recommendations with regard to aviation security.

United States. These security jobs require repetitive

First, because no current or near-term technology

tasks and are boring because personnel are searching

appeared capable of providing the profiling and bomb

for a rare event-the presence of explosives or weapons.

increase airline

Acknowledging that a security system will only be as

security, OTA concluded that an integrated approach

good as its weakest link, OTA suggested screeners

which combined a number of different detection

receive better training and that EDS systems automate

technologies would be preferable over one particular

the boring and repetitive tasks as much as possible.

detection technology

needed to

detection technology. This approach would allow the
different technologies to complement each other

Third, OTA thought there was adequate promise in the

because no one technology was able to provide the

field of aircraft and cargo container hardening to
recommend further research and development. Air

level of reliability required.

craft and cargo hardening would involve modifying
OTA did not recommend a specific configuration for

cargo containers to absorb shock waves, prevent

the

fragmentation, and to vent pressures; adding cargo bay

integrated approach.

Instead

it

provided

a

conceptual outline of what the integrated system might

liners to contain fragments; placing blow-out panels in

look like. In the first stage of the system, passenger

the fuselage to control skin ruptures and tearing; and

profiling and an advanced x-ray system would be used.

closing cavities and pathways between cargo con

When there was an indication that explosives were

tainers and in the aircraft structure that have the

present additional scrutiny would be triggered. Stage

potential of acting as conduits of shock waves.

two of the system would use a different technology,
elaborate and expensive device such as computerized

Developments in the EDS Field
Between 1991 and Late 1992

tomography or TNA. OTA emphasized that the

In August 1992 Heathrow airport concluded six weeks

particular system used by an airport would be tailored

of tests on the modified Model 101ZZ backscatter x-

to the specific needs and characteristicsof that airport.

ray system.18 Both the airport and developer seemed

possibly vapor detection. Stage three would use a more

optimal

pleased with its performance during this operational

configuration for the system would be fairly easy and

test. It was estimated about 3,600 bags could be

be dependent on things like peak passenger flow,

scanned per hour by the system and human inter

OTA

thought

determination

of

the

required throughput rate (how many bags can be

vention was needed only if the x-ray detects an object

processed per hour), cost constraints, acceptable false

with characteristicsof an explosive.

alarm rate, and room (size and weight of the system).
The FAA, in August 1992 altered its policy and began
The second recommendation that OTA made regarding

to allow airlines to voluntarily use enhanced x-ray and

aviation security was that more emphasis be placed on

vapor screening devices to screen carry-on electronic

human factors in commercial aviation security. It noted

items.1'1 Checked baggage could not be screened by

that technology has its limitations and it was unrealistic

these technologies because the FAA believed there

to expect commercial aviation security to be totally

were too many limitations associated with these

automated. Therefore OTA suggested paying increased

technologies and their use might provide a false sense

attention to passenger profiling.

of security.

OTA also underscored the importance of well-trained

This new policy was met with a cool reception among

and highly motivated “screeners”-those individuals

airlines. The airlinesexpressed disappointment with the

who operate the metal detectors everyone must pass

lack of attention and resources the FAA was devoting

Fall 1996
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TABLE 4
Advantages and Disadvantages of Selected Explosives Detection Techniques*
Type

Chemiluminescence

Electron capture

Advantages

Disadvantages

Cost; size; detects plastics; good at
identifying particular molecular
compounds
Very low cost; size; may detect
plastics

Ion mobility
TNA

Cost; size; may detect plastics
Detects plastics; no vapor needed

X-ray, dual energy, or
backscatter

Cost and size relatively small; can see
other weapons; may see sheets or
small quantities of explosives
Very high 3-D spatial resolution; good
for detection of small quantities

Computerized
tomography

Slow; requires vapors or residues

Slow; requires vapors or residues; not good
at identifying particular molecular
compounds
Requires vapors or residues
Large; expensive; high false-alarm rates;
inadequate sensitivity
Not specific to explosives; questionable
sensitivity to small or thin quantities of
explosives
Not specific to explosives; looks only at
density; slow; large; expensive

* A major concern with technologies that rely on the detection of explosive vapors or residues was the large
amount of “background noise” created by the surrounding environment. In other words, the general atmosphere
contains elements that are similar to those generated by explosives making it difficult to develop a vapor or
residue detector that has the necessary level of sensitivity without a high false alarm rate.
Source: Adapted from U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technology Against Terrorism The
Federal Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991), Table 5-1, p. 62.

to explosive detection system development.

They

pointed out while the FAA had been slow in evaluating

other requests for reports on subjects in the aviation
security area were made.21

and testing devices, European countries have been
quite active. Over 52 Egis vapor detection systems had

Explosive Detection Systems. The FAA has a central

been ordered and 21

role in developing new security technology.

machines were already in

To

operation at 12 European airports. In addition, airline

accomplish this objective the FAA “...(1) establishes

officials expressed concern that the explosive detection

performance standards for equipment, (2) selects the

systems under development would be very costly.20

mix of technologies for development, (3) provides

The GAO Studies

tests equipment to ensure that it meets the performance

The Aviation and Security Improvement Act of 1990

standards, and (5) certifies (approves) the equipment as

required the FAA to have EDS in place by November

suitable for airlines’ use.”22 Obviously the FAA has a

1993. Despite a sizable increase in the FAA’s security

lot of responsibility and a huge amount of risk.

oversight and technical assistance to contractors, (4)

research and development budget and the opening of

Development of EDS involves new and untested

the FAA’s Technical Center in Atlantic City, the FAA

technology and it is difficult to predict how an idea

missed the deadline. In fact, it appeared the FAA was

that is conceptually sound and works in a laboratory

years away from meeting the objective. This prompted

setting will perform under realistic testing conditions.

various members of Congress to ask the GAO to
update them on progress with EDS. In addition, two

14
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Unfortunately, the FAA was not able to meet the

continue to evolve and the airlines may not be the

November 1993 deadline set forth in the 1990 Act. In

correct group to ensure upgrades and improvements are

fact, there were no devices in operation at airports that

made in EDS. Third, the FAA’s approach only seems

had not been approved and in use before the Pan Am

logical if there are many competing technologies to

bombing in 1988.

Compounding the problem, the

choose from. This, of course, did not appear to be a

FAA was unable, as of early 1994, to predict when an

reasonable assumption because not one device had

EDS capable of meeting its requirements for detecting

been approved by

sophisticated explosives in checked baggage would be

questionable whether the airline industry has the

approved.

financial resources to conduct the research and analysis

Technical difficulties were cited as the

early

1994.

Finally,

it

is

necessary for integration.24

reason for the delay:
“As of December 1993, FAA had 40 research

Aircraft Hardening.

explosive detection projects, including 14

receive a fair amount of attention by the FAA in 1992,

prototype units, 4 of which are suitable for

receiving a dedicated research and development

screening checked baggage.

Our review of

Aircraft hardening began to

funding line in fiscal year 1993.

The FAA and the

the development status of the 14 prototypes

early tests indicated it was feasible to contain the

showed that 9 had been delayed-by 1 to 18

effects of explosions.

months-because

problems.

cost, weight, and durability of the new luggage

of

technical

Concerns remained about the

Furthermore, FAA has conducted laboratory

containers. Also, due to the size of the prototypes the

tests on only seven devices; none fully meets

hardened containers only could be used on wide-bodied

FAA’s performance standards. FAA officials

aircraft. Wide-body aircraft only make up 29 percent

said that they expect to have five additional

of the aircraft worldwide while almost 75 percent of

advanced prototypes available for testing in

the bombings between 1971 and 1991 occurred on

fiscal year 1994 but could not estimate when

narrow-body aircraft.

the new devices would be certified for
industry use.”23

Unless the weight and durability concerns with regard
to blast resistant luggage containers are remedied,

Another criticism leveled at the FAA was its failure to

airlines most likely will not voluntarily replace worn

place much emphasis on systems integration when

out luggage containers with the more secure ones. If

technology is approved for EDS use. While the FAA

these issues cannot be solved, the FAA probably will

endorsed

have to mandate the containers.

the

idea that

combining

systems,

as

recommended in the OTA report, makes sense, it
believed the task of integration should be left to the

Another

facet

of

aircraft

hardening

is

blast

airlines. Because the airlines ultimately are responsible

management.

for the security of their passengers, the FAA suggested

aircraft technology that will allow an aircraft to

they were in a better position to assess their security

withstand internal explosions. At the time of the GAO

needs and the needs of the airports they service.

report, little progress had been made in this area.25

The GAO found this line of reasoning faulty for a

The Certification Process.:6Another area that came

number of reasons. First, many potential software and

under close scrutiny by the GAO was the process the

hardware problems could be avoided if integration of

FAA set up to approve explosive detection systems.

systems is promoted from the very beginning instead

One major criticism the GAO had with the process was

Blast management involves designing

of attempting to integrate after the technology is

its lack of operational testing. The FAA claimed

developed. Second, EDS technology most likely would

operational testing would add both time and cost to the
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TABLE 5
FAA's Security RE&D Budget, Fiscal Years 1988-94 ($ millions)
Program

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Explosive Detection
Airport Security
Aircraft Hardening Program
Human Factors

$9.6
0
0
0
$9.6

$9.9
0
0
0
$9.9

$17.0
0
0
0
$17.0

$30.3
$2.0
0
0
$32.3

$27.3
$4.2
0
0
$31.5

$26.4
$4.0
$4.5
$1.0
$35.9

$22.8
$2.5
$7.8
$2.8
$35.9

Total

Source: United States General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic
and International Challenges (Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting Office, GAO/RCED-94-38, January
1994), Table 3.1, page 41 and United States General Accounting Office, Aviation Security Development of New
Security Technology Has Not Met Expectations (Washington, D C.: Government Accounting Office, GAO/RCED94-142, May 1994), Table 1.1, page 11.

approval

process,

things

critics

were

already

complaining about. In lieu of its own operational tests,

new technology basing the standards on the operational
needs of the department.

the FAA was relying on contractors to perform
operational tests.

A third criticism of the approval process was the lack
of performance standards for trace detection systems.

There were a number of difficulties associated with this

As late as March 1993 the National Academy of

arrangement, according to the GAO. Contractors may

Sciences, which was under contract to the FAA to set

not be conducting objective, realistic tests; they may be

performance standards, reported it could not achieve the

using a laboratory prototype instead of the final market

objective.

model and the performance may vary dramatically

distinguishing between“...very small tracesofexplosive

between the two types of machines; most importantly,

material and much larger quantities of other materials

the FAA was not inspecting the testing conditions nor

in an airport terminal.”27

The Academy cited the difficulty in

witnessing the tests, meaning it had no way to verify
the contractors’ tests.

AccessControl.:x Access control has been an important
component of commercial aviation security in the

Another major criticism of the certification process was

United States for a number of years. In 1989 the FAA

the lack of reliability standards for the devices being

passed stringent regulations governing access control,

tested. In essence, the FAA could approve an EDS

and the FAA has required more airports to adhere to

without having any idea how often the system would be

the regulations over the intervening years. By August

out of service. The airlines expressed great reservations

1994, 258 airports were required to “...(1) ensure that

with this omission because of the effect unreliable

only authorized persons gain access to secured areas,

security equipment could have on their performance and

(2)

operations. The FAA countered that it was too difficult

authorization is revoked, (3) differentiate between

to develop reliability standards, and it would lengthen

persons with unlimited access to the secured area and

the approval process if it did. The GAO pointed out

persons with only partial access, and (4) be capable of

that other government agencies, such as the Department

limiting access by time and date.”29

of Defense, routinely develop reliability standards for

16
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immediately deny

access to

persons

whose

a sensible

its standards on their countries’ carriers. In addition, the

component of an overall commercial aviation security

FAA argues that the emphasis should be on the airport

While these regulations seem

to

be

plan, the cost of adhering to the regulations has greatly

the international carrier is flying from rather than the

exceeded the FAA’s own cost estimates. Originally it

airline itself. Levels of security may vary widely on the

was projected the costs to meet the regulations would

same airline depending on what airport the airline is

be $211 million for the 1989-98 time span. More recent

departing. Therefore the focus should be both on

projections, which include actual costs already incurred,

international airline security plans and on location.

amount to $654 million for the 1989-98 period.’11 Not

Obviously, this makes FAA’s task much more complex

surprisingly, the costs of access control have been a

and more costly.

major concern of airlines which must bear the Financial
burden.

The Air Transport Association (ATA) is very concerned
with the inconsistency in domestic and international

The reason for these greatly escalated costs, according

security. While their primary concern is security, the

to GAO, is the FAA’s lack of sufficient guidelines and

ATA

standards for airports to follow while trying to adhere

disadvantage created for domestic carriers by the more

also

is

concerned

about

the

competitive

to the regulations. As a result, many airports have

stringent security regulations. Table 6 outlines the

purchased access controls that provide a level of control

argument fairly well underscoring the rather steep

significantly above what is required. Also, many

opportunity costs placed on customers of domestic

airports contracted with vendors to develop hardware

carriers relative to customers of international carriers

and software for access control systems and now are at

serving the same routes.

the mercy of the vendors because the system is
proprietary. In other words, many airports cannot “shop

Recent Developments

the competition" for maintenance or upgrades because

In

there is no competition.

Kingdom’s Transport Department had set late 1996 as

September

1994

it was reported

the United

a deadline for screening all baggage carried in the
Similar Security on Domestic and International Routes.

cargo hold of all international commercial flights.32

The 1990 Act required the FAA to ensure a similar

This rule affects 50 airports in Great Britain. It

level of protection for U S. citizens traveling abroad as

requires airports either to inspect 100% of checked

is provided to those traveling domestically. Inter

baggage by hand, subject all bags to conventional x-

national security standards generally are less stringent

rays and search 10% of the bags by hand, or use an

than the ones set by the FAA. The 1990 Act “...permits

automated explosive detection system.

FAA to accept a foreign carrier’s security program only
if FAA determines that the program provides a level of

Airports in the U.K. have been taking the lead in

protection similar to that provided by U.S. carriers

improving the screening of luggage. BAA Pic., the

serving the same airports.”31 Despite passing regulations

private company that operates seven airports in the

in 1989 that require foreign carriers flying to or from

U.K. including Heathrow and Gatwick, just concluded

the United States to get their security plans approved by

an 18 month trial of a five-tier screening program at

the FAA, there still exists a large discrepancy between

Glasgow airport in 1994. Results indicated that about

security on domestic carriers flying international routes

80% of bags are cleared at the level one while the

and foreign carriers flying the same routes.

other 20% are sent on for further testing. Level two
involved a combination of automated screening by dual

The major stumbling block, according to the FAA, is a

energy x-ray devices and close inspection by a human

diplomatic one. The FAA believes many foreign

operator. About 1 % of the bags originally checked

governments would balk at the United States imposing

required further screening past level two.
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TABLE 6
Differences Related To FAA Security Program
Foreign Flag
U.S. Airline
1.

2.

Passenger processing at airport
*
Security interview at point
of baggage acceptance
*
Physical search of baggage
and carry-on items
*
X-ray of baggage
*
Security questions at gate
*
Total number of passenger
processing points including
immigration
*
Total processing time prior
to flight departure
Airport terminal facilities
*
Visible security barriers at
check-in
*
Check-in counters
*

*

X-ray equipment
Off airport check-in-rail
stations, cruiseships, hotels.
etc.
Gate areas

*

Aircraft parking locations

*

3.

4.

Aircraft Servicing
*
Screening of service
personnel
*
Cabin searches
★
Guarding of aircraft and
cabin during servicing
*
Overnight parking
*
Catering and cabin
supplies
*
Aircraft turn times

Cargo

Airline

2-5 minutes - all passengers

Not Applicable

5-20 minutes - selected passengers
(sometimes conducted in special facilities)
Required for all checked baggage
All passengers
4-5

Not Applicable

90-120 minutes average

20-30 minutes
average

Required

Not Applicable

Usually segregated in least accessible
areas.
Often cramped into check-in areas.
Generally prohibitive due to security
requirements.

Prominent,
convenient locations
Not Applicable
No Constraints

Sterile separation required.

Passenger
movement not
restricted.
Flexible

May be limited by security requirements.
i.e., remote parking.

Not Applicable
Not Applicable
2

Required

Not Applicable

Required
Required

Not Applicable
Not Applicable

Sealing and/or guarding of aircraft
Guarded and/or guarding of aircraft

Not Applicable
Not Applicable

Longer serving time due to security,
impacts aircraft utilization

Not Applicable

Special document and shipper verifications

Not Applicable

Continued . . .
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Continuing TABLE 6
Differences Related To FAA Security Program
U.S. Airline

5.

Operational Performance
*
Positive passenger bag
match

Required

*

Required

*

6.

Service Enhancements
*
Advance check-in

*

*

7.

Offload of baggage for
missing passengers
On-Time performance

Self-check-in and other
automation/" ticketless"
service
Expedite or premium
service handling

Customer Reaction
*
Complaints

*

Claims

*

Choice of carrier

Impacted by above procedures

Clearance through security measures
negates convenience of advance check-in

Precluded from full benefit due to security
requirements

Foreign Flag
Airline

Not required, some
carriers conduct
bag match on
intermittent basis
Several carriers
require
Generally not
impacted

Service convenience
can be offered with
advance boarding
passes
No Limits

Limited by security requirements

No Limits

Written, verbal complaints regarding
inconvenience, intrusiveness, or even
discrimination
Claims or lawsuits regarding alleged
harassment or discrimination
Security measures cause passengers to
avoid U.S. carriers

Not Applicable

Not Applicable
Benefit from
customers diverted
from U.S. carriers

Source: Air Transport Association, Congressional briefing materials.

The Egis explosive vapor detector was used for Level

checked luggage for explosives, producing either a

3 screening, and by the end of this level approximately

pass or fail signal. Therefore, it does not require any

99.9% of the bags checked were cleared.

The

operator interpretation of results. In a one-week field

remaining 0.1% of the total bags entering the

test at Los Angeles International Airport in late 1995,

screening system were hand searched in the presence

the QSCAN-1000 performed quite well.

of their owners. If an explosive was detected, the bag
entered level 5 which consists of calling in explosive

While Great Britain and the rest of Europe continue to

ordnance officials to deal with the situation.33

make progress in the testing and use of EDS, the
United States lags behind. Rather than relying on

More recently it was reported that full-scale tests on a

operational testing like the U.K., the U.S. continues

quadruple

in

to rely on laboratory testing as the crucial step in the

London.34 The QSCAN-1000 can be used to inspect

certification process. FAA’s use of this approach can

resonance

EDS were commencing
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CONCLUSIONS

be attributed to the requirement in the 1990 Act that a
system must be certified before the FAA administrator

While the threat against U.S. commercial aviation

can mandate its use. Not surprisingly, U.S. airlines

remains relatively low, the possible consequences of

are reluctant to voluntarily invest much time or

such an attack are frightening. The World Trade Center

resources in field testing an EDS that ultimately may

and Oklahoma City bombings highlighted the type of

not receive FAA approval. This means the FAA has

damage and casualties terrorists can inflict when they

little leverage to convince airlines to perform field

put their minds to it. It does not take much of a stretch

tests.35

to imagine commercial aviation is a tempting target for
anyone bent on wreaking havoc and injuring many

On December 9, 1994, the FAA certified its first

people with a single explosive device.

EDS. The system certified was the CTX 5000 which
“...uses transmission x-ray data to acquire an overall

Since the Pan Am tragedy in 1988. a lot of attention

map of the objects in the luggage. It then positions

has been focused on research and development to

strategic computer tomography slices to identify

improve commercial aviation security. There has been

objects

progress but it has been slower than most anticipated

that

may

be

explosives.

The

technical

challenges of increasing the size of the scanner

General concern has been voiced about the disap

opening to accommodate large bags and engineering a

pointing pace of EDS development and implementa

constantly rotating (rather than reciprocating) gantry

tion. The FAA missed its deadline by more than one

were solved, making it possible to scan passenger bags

year, certifying its first EDS in December 1994 instead

in seconds rather than the minutes previously required

of November 1993 as required in the 1990 Act. Many

for a medical scan.”36 The certification was the

reasons have been cited for this delay ranging from the

culmination of more than nine years of research and

FAA not directing the appropriate level of resources or

over $8.6 million spent by the FAA.

attention to research and development to the daunting
technological challenges it has faced in developing

The next step for the CTX 5000 is at least two

EDS.

operational trials at different airports and each lasting
one year. The purpose of the trials is to help anticipate

Another major area of contention

and solve some of the operational challenges that will

integration of EDS. Despite OTA’s conclusion that an

be faced as the EDS is integrated into baggage

integrated approach is the only way to proceed and

involves the

handling systems. The FAA estimates it eventually

FAA's admission that this was the correct conclusion,

may cost airlines around $500 million to install the

the FAA is doing little, if anything, to promote

CTX 5000 if the FAA chooses to mandate its adoption

integration. Instead, it is relying on the airlines, who

after the trials end in 1997.37

are responsible for the safety and security of their
passengers, to decide how best to achieve integration.

There has been some recent progress in the aircraft
hardening area too. A container has been developed

The experience with access control should be sufficient

that can withstand the force of an explosion that is

to convince the FAA it should re-think its approach to

greater than the one that downed Pan Am 103 in 1988.

integration. Its failure to set standards and issue

Also, the prototype container addresses the airlines’

guidelines for airlines and airports to follow as they

concerns with regard to maintenance and the weight of

worked to meet the access control regulations has been

the

blamed for the runaway costs of access control.

container

is

close

to

the

range

deemed

acceptable.38
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Taking a similar “hands off’ approach to integration

objectives at the expense of others. This, in turn, will

raises the probability that enhanced security will be

leave plenty of room for disagreement as not everyone

more costly than it would be if the FAA took a

will agree with the FAA’s priorities.

leadership role.
At some point, the question should be posed: “Do the
A third area of concern is the fact that European

benefits from increased security warrant the costs?”

countries seem to be way ahead of the United States in

Congress is implicitly asking (and answering) this

the field testing and utilization of EDS. Part of the lag

question as it revamps the welfare system, Medicaid,

can be attributed to the requirement in the 1990 Act

and Medicare. It only seems logical the same test

that the FAA must certify a system before it mandates

ought to be applied to commercial aviation security.

its use. Another contributing factor to the lag is that

The ensuing debate should be quite interesting!

fact that airlines are responsible for security in the
United States while the government generally is
responsible in Europe. Airlines are understandably

REFERENCES
1.

“Flight Delays Are Expected to Worsen Amid

reluctant to take the lead in EDS development and

Bomb Threats, Equipment Woes,” The Wall Street

testing due to the high degree of risk associated with

Journal, August 30, 1995, p. A3.

the new technology.

2.

While the cause of the explosion has not yet been
determined, there are indications a bomb or a

Also, it is reasonable to believe there are economies of
scale in security technology implementation. The

missile may be the source.
3.

Lisa Miller, “Security Alert:

‘Hurry Up and

implication is that a more centralized approach to

Wait,’” The Wall Street Journal, October 6, 1994,

security may be more cost effective. It is not difficult

p. BIO.

to imagine that one system designed for a particular

4.

United States General Accounting Office, A viation

airport makes more sense than separate systems for

Security:

each airline serving a particular airport. In reality,

Domestic

security systems generally are designed for the entire

(Washington, D.C.:

airport, but the current arrangement requires lengthy

Office, GAO/RCED-94-38, January 1994), p. 11.

negotiations among the airport and the airlines serving

5.

it to arrive at a security plan acceptable to all. It seems

Additional Actions Needed to Meet
and

International

Challenges

Government Accounting

U S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

logical to vest the responsibility for designing an

Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal
Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, DC: U.S.

integrated

Government Printing Office, July 1991), pp. 16 -

security

system

with

the

airport

management, encouraging them to coordinate with the
airlines and the FAA. This approach may result in

17.
6.

David Hughes, “FAA Examining Missile Threat.”

more risk taking with regard to the field testing of

Aviation Week & Space Technology> 139 (August

EDS, possibly closing the technological gap with

16, 1993): 31-32.

European airports.

7.

United States General Accounting Office, Aviation

Security:

Additional Actions Needed to Meet

One thing is clear, enhanced commercial aviation

Domestic

security is costly.

(Washington, D.C.:

In the current budget-cutting

atmosphere it is naive to think the FAA will receive
additional resources to achieve its security objectives

and

International

Challenges

Government Accounting

Office, GAO/RCED-94-38, January' 1994), p. 12.
8.

David

Hughes,

“Pentagon

Study

Calls

for

as quickly as most would like. Therefore, the FAA will

Terrorism Review,” Aviation Week & Space

have to continue to prioritize tasks meaning it will

Technology 142 (May 15, 1995): 33-34.

devote time and resources to particular security

Fall 1996

21

9.

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

Technology Against Terrorism:

The Federal

Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, DC:

U.S.

possible.

For a complete explanation see U.S.

Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

Technology' Against Terrorism:

Government Printing Office, July 1991).
10. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

Technology Against Terrorism:

15. A simple explanation of these technologies is not

Structuring

Security, OTA-ISC-511 (Washington, DC: U.S.

The Federal

Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, DC:

U.S.

Government Printing Office, July 1991). pp. 81 86.
16. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

Government Printing Office, January 1992).
11. This section draws heavily from U.S. Congress,

Technology Against Terrorism:

The Federal

Office of Technology Assessment, Technology

Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, DC:

Against Terrorism:

Government Printing Office, July 1991), p. 61.

The Federal Effort, OTA-

U.S.

U.S. Government

17. This section draws heavily from U.S. Congress,

12. TNA “...measures the presence of nitrogen by

Against Terrorism: Structuring Security, OTA-

ISC-481 (Washington, DC:

Office of Technology Assessment, Technology

Printing Office, July 1991).
means of the interaction of thermalized neutrons

ISC-51 1 (Washington, DC:

(from a radioactive californium source) with the

Printing Office, January 1992).

nitrogen nuclei. This interaction produces high-

18. “BackscatterX-rayExplosives DetectorCompletes

energy gamma radiation of a characteristic energy

Tests on Heathrow Baggage,” Aviation Week &

that is then detected.” U.S. Congress, Office of

Space Technology 137 (August 10, 1992): 35.

Technology’ Against
The Federal Effort, OTA-ISC-481

Technology Assessment,

Terrorism:

(Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing

19. Edward L. McKenna, “FAA Permits Operational
Testing

of Advanced

13. With magnetic resonance, a sample to be

20. Christopher P. Fotos, “Bomb Detection Shows
Promise

Despite

field and ... expose[d]...to a radio-frequency

Aviation

Week

field.

Then,

the

procedure requires varying the frequency (or
the magnetic field strength) and noting the
frequencies (or magnetic field strengths) at
which the sample absorbs or emits RF
energy.

Detectors,”

Aviation Week & Space Technology’ 137 (August

tested is placed “...in a uniform magnetic
(RF) electromagnetic

Explosive

17, 1992): 39.

Office, July 1991), p. 40.

Growing

&

Cost

Space

Concerns,”

Technology

137

(November 23, 1992): 76,78.
21. The first report addressed what actions must be
taken to meet domestic and international aviation
security challenges. The second report discussed
the progress in development of new security
technology and the challenges facing the FAA. A

The nuclear quadrupole resonance

third report, issued in March 1995 analyzed the

method employs a similar procedure but does

issue of how airport access systems could be

not require a uniform magnetic field.” U.S.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

made cost-effective.
22. United States General AccountingOffice,4v/a//o/7

Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal
Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, DC:

Security:

U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991),

(Washington, D.C.:

14. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

Technology Against Terrorism:

Technology’

Development
Has

Not

of
Met

New

Security’

Expectations

Government Accounting

Office, GAO/RCED-94-142, May 1994), p. 10.

p. 47.
The Federal

Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, DC:

U.S.

Government Printing Office, July 1991), p. 78.

22

U.S. Government

Journal of Transportation Management

23. United StatesGeneral AccountingOfflce,/fv/ar/o«

Security: Development
Technology Has Not
(Washington,

D.C.:

of New Security
Met
Expectations

Government

Accounting

Office, GAO/RCED-94-142, May 1994), p. 18.
24. United States General Accounting Office, A viation

Domestic

Additional Actions Needed to Meet
and International Challenges

(Washington, D.C.:

Government Accounting

Office, GAO/RCED-94-38, January 1994), p. 21.
32. David Hughes, “U.K., U.S. Pursue Baggage
Screening,” Aviation Week & Space Technology

Government Accounting

33. David Hughes, “U.K., U.S. Pursue Baggage

Office, GAO/RCED-94-142, May 1994), p. 38.
25. United States General Accounting Office, Aviation

Security: Development
Technology Has Not
(Washington, D.C.:

Security:

of New Security
Met
Expectations

Security: Development
Technology Has Not
(Washington, D.C.:

31. United States General AccountingOffice,^v/c7//on

of New Security
Met
Expectations

Government Accounting

Office, GAO/RCED-94-142, May 1994).

141 (September 5, 1994): 74, 83.
Screening,” Aviation Week & Space Technology
141 (September 5, 1994): 74.
34. Michael O. Lavitt, “Luggage Inspection System
Uses Resonance Technology,” Aviation Week &

Space Technology 144 (February 5, 1996): 92-93.
35. Edward L. McKenna, “FAA Permits Operational

26. This section draws heavily from United States
General Accounting Office, Aviation Security':

Testing

of Advanced

Explosive

Detectors,”

Aviation Week & Space Technology 137 (August

Development of New Security Technology’ Has Not
Met
Expectations (Washington,
D.C.:

36. “FAA News Fact Sheet,” December 20, 1994.

Government Accounting Office, GAO/RCED-94-

37. Aviation Daily, Wednesday December 21, 1994.

142, May 1994).

38. “New Luggage Container Withstands Big Blasts,”

27. United States General AccountingOffice,/lv/ar/on

Security: Development
Technology Has Not
(Washington, D.C.:

of New Security
Met
Expectations

17, 1992): 39.

Aviation Week& Space Technology 144 (February
5, 1996): 92.

Government Accounting

Office, GAO/RCED-94-142, May 1994), p. 35.
28. This section draws heavily on United States
General Accounting Office, Aviation Security:

FA A Can Help Ensure That Airports’ Access
Control Systems Are Cost-Effective, (Washington,
DC.:

Government

Accounting

Office,

GAO/RCED-95-25, March 1995).
29. United States General AccountingOffice,/lv/at/o/7

Security: FA A Can Help Ensure That Airports’
Access Control Systems Are Cost-Effective,
(Washington, D.C.:

Government Accounting

Office, GAO/RCED-95-25, March 1995), p. 3.
30. Both projections are in constant 1993 dollars.
United States General Account ing Office, A viation

Security: FAA Can Help Ensure That A irports ’
Access Control Systems Are Cost-Effective
(Washington, D.C.:

Government Accounting

Office, GAO/RCED-95-25, March 1995), p. 24.

Fall 1996

23

